The Constitutionality of the NFL Patdown Policy after Sheehan and Johnston by Roberts, David G.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 3
2008
The Constitutionality of the NFL Patdown Policy
after Sheehan and Johnston
David G. Roberts
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
David G. Roberts, The Constitutionality of the NFL Patdown Policy after Sheehan and Johnston, 58 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 979 (2008)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol58/iss3/17
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NFL
PATDOWN POLICY AFTER SHEEHAN
AND JOHNSTON
INTRODUCTION: THE NFL PATDOWN POLICY AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
In 2005, the National Football League ("NFL") urged its
franchises to institute a patdown policy to protect members of the
public that attend NFL games.' The decision to recommend this
policy was based on the NFL's conclusion that its stadiums were
attractive terrorist targets. As evidence, the NFL pointed to several
examples of global terror, including the 2004 and 2005 suicide
bombings in London and Madrid, a foiled plan to bomb a soccer
venue in Spain, and the NFL's understanding that certain individuals
with alleged ties to terrorist organizations had already downloaded
information about two NFL stadiums.2
To date, at least three sets of plaintiffs have challenged the
constitutionality of this patdown policy under the Fourth Amendment
or its state equivalent.3 By its terms, the Fourth Amendment
guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures .. ". .'4 The "unreasonable search" at issue in these NFL
patdown cases is the suspicionless patdown of every ticket holder
prior to gaining stadium entry. According to the NFL, the patdown
focuses on the detection of improvised explosive devices ("IEDs"). 5
During this patdown, fans are asked to "hold their arms out to their
I Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth. (Johnston 1), 490 F.3d 820, 822 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
2 Id.at822n.1.
3 These cases include Johnston I; Sheehan v. The San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., 62 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); and The Chicago Park Dist. v. The Chicago Bears Football
Club, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58621 (N.D. Il. 2006).
4 U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.
5 Johnston 11, 490 F.3d at 822.
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side, palms up" as screeners "run their hands along the sides of the
torso, and down the spine."6 The process involves "touching, patting,
or lightly rubbing."7 If the screener observes or feels any "suspicious
bulges," the screener may instruct the patron to empty his pockets.8
Anyone who refuses to be patted down is denied entry into the
stadium.
9
The Supreme Court has specifically held that a weapons patdown
is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.'0 Since the
NFL has stated that the primary purpose of the patdown is to search
for IEDs, the patdown policy clearly raises issues regarding the
privacy rights of each ticket holder subject to the search. This
Comment aims to address three of these issues.
First, what role does "consent" play in the right-of-privacy
analysis as it applies to the NFL patdown policy? Anyone who has
attended an NFL game has witnessed tens of thousands of fans slowly
migrate through stadium security checkpoints without a hint of
protest. 1 Does this conduct preclude fans from challenging the NFL
patdown policy? Second, even if fans legally consent to the patdown,
is the NFL patdown policy still an unconstitutional condition to
stadium entry? And third, regardless of whether a ticket holder
consents to the patdown before entering an NFL stadium, is the NFL
patdown policy nevertheless constitutionally justified by a "special
need" to protect public safety? As mentioned above, courts have
already begun to address these very questions. This Comment first
summarizes Sheehan v. The San Francisco 49ers, Limited. and the
Johnston cases, then addresses whether the NFL policy violates the
Fourth Amendment by answering the specific questions raised above.
6 ld. at 823.
7 Sheehan, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 806.
9 Johnston v. Tampa Bay Sports Auth. (Johnston 1), 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1260 (M.D.
Fla. 2006), rev'd, 490 F.3d 820 (11 th Cir. 2007).
9 Id.
10 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968) ("[l]t is nothing less than sheer torture of the
English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing
all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search."').
11 Aside from the occasional groan in annoyance from having to wait in considerably long
lines.
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I. THE NFL PATDOWN CASES 12
A. Sheehan v. The San Francisco 49ers, Ltd.
Prior to the 2005 NFL season, the San Francisco 49ers (the
"49ers") agreed to institute a "patdown-inspection" policy that
required each ticket holder to be inspected before entering the 49ers'
stadium, Monster Park. 13 Although the patdowns were administered
by 49ers personnel in front of the ticket gates outside the stadium,
members of the San Francisco Police Department were stationed
nearby.' 4 Among those subject to the patdowns were forty-year
season-ticket holders Daniel and Kathleen Sheehan (the "Sheehans").
After attending several 49ers games, the Sheehans decided to file suit
against the 49ers in state court, alleging that the patdowns breached
their inalienable right to privacy, as provided by California's "Privacy
Initiative."' 15 Because Monster Park was owned and operated by the
San Francisco 49ers, a private entity, no Fourth Amendment claim
was raised.' 6 The Sheehans sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
requesting the court to: (1) find the patdown policy in violation of
California's Privacy Initiative; and (2) enjoin the 49ers from
continuing the patdowns.' 7 The 49ers demurred and a hearing date
was set.
At the hearing the trial court questioned whether the Sheehans'
complaint was still ripe, since the 2005 NFL season, which was in
progress when the complaint was filed, had since ended. 18 To address
12 As mentioned above, this section merely summarizes the facts and analysis of the
Sheehan and Johnston cases. Part 11 further explores the issues raised in these cases and also
addresses whether or not the NFL patdown policy is constitutional.
13 Sheehan, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 805-06.
14 Id.
15 Id. The "Privacy Initiative" refers to Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.
"All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL CONST. art. I, § 1 (2007) (emphasis
added). The section replaced former Article 1, Section 1 in November 5, 1974 and explicitly
established the right of privacy as an inalienable right in California. See Cent. Valley Chap. 7th
Step Found. v. Younger, 157 Cal. Rptr. 117, 129 (Ct. App. 1979).
16 The Fourth Amendment protects citizens only from government intrusions. See Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) ("The Fourth Amendment gives protection against
unlawful searches and seizures, and ... its protection applies to governmental action.").
Although Sheehan involves a state right of privacy claim, many of the legal issues that were
addressed are the same issues addressed in Fourth Amendment cases. Thus, although the
opinion carries limited weight as precedent in federal court, the Sheehan court's reasoning and
discussion seems very relevant to the Fourth Amendment debate regarding the NFL patdown
policy. Incidentally, Sheehan is critical to this Comment's analysis.
17 Sheehan, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 806.
18 Id.
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the trial court's concerns, the Sheehans amended their complaint and
stipulated that, in addition to purchasing 2005 season tickets, they
also purchased 2006 season tickets.' 9 This amendment would prove
fatal. Because the Sheehans had attended 2005 football games at
Monster Park, the trial court concluded that they must have had
advance notice of the patdown policy before purchasing 2006 season
tickets. Thus, when the Sheehans "re-upped" their season tickets for
2006, they "impliedly consented to the patdowns., 20 According to the
court, this consent foreclosed any reasonable expectation of privacy
with regard to the patdowns.2 ' Consequently, the court granted the
49ers' motion to dismiss the Sheehans' claims without leave to
amend.
After undertaking an independent review of the order to sustain the
49ers' demurrer, California's First Appellate District affirmed the
trial court's ruling. According to the appellate court, the Sheehans'
claim was properly dismissed because it "'involve[d] so insignificant
or de minimis an intrusion on a constitutionally protected privacy
interest as not even to require an explanation or justification by the
defendant."'' 22 The Supreme Court of California has since granted
petition for review.23
B. The Johnston Cases
1. Johnston I
In September 2005, the Tampa Sports Authority ("TSA"), a
Florida public entity that grants the Tampa Bay Buccaneers (the
"Buccaneers") use of Raymond James Stadium, instituted a policy
requiring patdown searches of all persons attending Buccaneers
football games.24 The Buccaneers, a private commercial entity,
employed "outside screeners" to conduct the patdown inspections. As
19 Id.
20 Id. at 808.
21 Id.
22 Sheehan, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 807 quoting Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200,
1230 (Cal. 1997). The appeals court used the three prong Hill analysis to dismiss the Sheehans'
claim against the 49ers. Under the Hill test, a plaintiff asserting a California Privacy Initiative
claim must show the existence of three threshold elements: (1) a legally protected privacy
interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (3) conduct on the part of the defendant
constituting a serious invasion of privacy. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Ath. Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 657
(Cal. 1994). The appeals court held that the Sheehans failed the second element. Specifically,
like the trial court, the appeals court reasoned that the advance notice of the patdown policy
foreclosed any reasonable expectation of privacy. Sheehan, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 808-09.
23 Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., 169 P.3d 883 (Cal. October 10, 2007).
24 Johnston H, 490 F.3d 820, 822 (11 th Cir. 2007).
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in Sheehan, if the screeners discovered contraband during a patdown,
they were supposed to alert uniformed police officers stationed
nearby.25 TSA and the Buccaneers shared in the expense of the
screeners, and TSA oversaw how the search policy was conducted.26
Before the 2005 NFL season, Gordon Johnston, a Buccaneers
season-ticket holder, called the Buccaneers to discuss and object to
the new patdown policy.27 Not surprisingly, the phone call did not
deter the Buccaneers from implementing the policy as planned. Early
in the 2005 season, Johnston presented himself and his ticket at an
entrance to Raymond James Stadium on three separate occasions. On
each occasion, a screener advised Johnston of the patdown policy.
28
And, on each occasion, Johnston verbally objected to the patdown but
eventually allowed the screener to conduct the search so he could
attend the football game. 29
After attending his second Buccaneers game, Johnston sued TSA
in state court, challenging the constitutionality of the patdown
searches under the Florida Constitution.30 After the third game a
Florida state court enjoined the searches and Johnston attended
subsequent games without being subjected to patdowns. 31 Johnston
then amended his complaint to allege that the patdowns also violated
32the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The case
was removed to federal court and TSA sought reconsideration of the
preliminary injunction.
TSA urged the court to dissolve the injunction for three reasons:
(1) TSA's role in implementing the patdown policy did not constitute
"state action"; (2) the patdown searches were not unreasonable
because they were justified by a "special need"; and (3) Johnston had
impliedly consented to the patdown search.33 The Johnston I court
rejected all three.
First, the Johnston I court dismissed TSA's claim that when it
implemented the patdown policy it was not "acting in a governmental
capacity" but instead as a "managing agent" pursuant to its stadium
agreement with the Buccaneers. 34 According to the court, a public
entity "cannot contract away its public status." Since there was a
25 Id. at 823 n.2.
26 Id. at 823.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Johnston If, 490 F.3d 820, 824 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
30 Id. at 823.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 824.
33 Johnston 1, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
Id. at 1263.
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"sufficiently close nexus" between TSA and the challenged conduct,
the district court decided that "the conduct may be fairly treated as
that of the TSA itself. '35 As support, the court noted that TSA had
voted to implement the patdown policy, hired and supervised the
screeners, and paid for the patdowns with public flrnds. 6
Next, the Johnston I court moved to the merits of the Fourth
Amendment claim and recognized the general rule that mass
suspicionless searches are per se unconstitutional.37 According to
TSA, the patdown policy should be exempt from this general rule
because protecting the public from terrorist attacks at NFL games fell
under a "special needs" exception.38 The Johnston I court disagreed.
Although the record demonstrated that large gatherings were subject
to a generalized threat of terrorism, the court held that TSA had not
met its burden of establishing that a "substantial and real" risk of
terrorism existed at NFL stadiums. 39 Finding a "special[-]need"
exception here, the court reasoned, would "essentially condone mass
suspicionless searches of every person attending any large event,
including ... high school graduations, indoor and outdoor concerts,
and parades. ' 4
Finally, the court dealt with the issue of consent. TSA argued that
any privacy intrusion under the instant facts and circumstances could
not be unconstitutional, since Johnston had actually consented to the
patdowns at issue. In support, TSA showed that Johnston repeatedly
attended games fully aware that he would be subjected to a patdown
search as a condition of entry.4 '
Although the district court recognized .'[v]alid consent legitimizes
an otherwise unconstitutional search,"' it held that the consent was
invalid for two reasons.42 First, the particular type of consent at
issue--"where the government conditions receipt of a benefit ... on
the waiver of a constitutional right"-was invalid as an
unconstitutional condition.43  Second, regardless of the
unconstitutional condition TSA imposed, Johnston's conduct fell
short of legal consent because it was not "voluntarily given, free from
35 Id.
6 Id. at 1264.
37 Id. at 1265.
38 Johnston 1, 442 F.Supp. 2d at 1266.
39 Id. citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
4 Johnston 1, 442 F.Supp. 2d at 1269.41 ld. at 1271.
42 Id. (citing Lenz v. Winbum, 51 F.3d 1540, 1548 (11 th Cir. 1995)).
43 Johnston 1, 442 F.Supp. 2d at 1271 (citing Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1324
(1 th Cir. 2004)).
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constraint." 44 According to the court, after voicing his concern and
objections, Johnston was faced with the dubious choice of either
subjecting himself to the patdown searches or losing not only his
opportunity to attend the football game, but also the value of his
tickets, his parking pass, and his seat deposit. Such a decision, the
court reasoned, could not constitute valid consent. The Johnston I
court denied TSA's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction
enjoining them from administering the patdown policy.45
2. Johnston II
In a short opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reversed Johnston .46 For the Eleventh Circuit the issue was
simple. The record was "replete with evidence of the advance notice
Johnston was given of the searches including preseason notice,
pregame notice, and notice of the search point itself. 4 7 Coupling this
notice with the fact that Johnston: (1) presented himself willingly at
the search point; (2) was under no threat of physical or other
retribution if he refused the search; and (3) was well aware of his
right to refuse the patdown, the Johnston II court held that it was
"clear error" for the district court to have found that Johnston had not
voluntarily consented to the patdowns." In response to the district
court's determination that the patdown policy was also an
unconstitutional condition, the Eleventh Circuit claimed that Johnston
possessed only a license for a spectator's seat at Buccaneers football
games. This license, according the court, could be revoked at any
time and for any reason, subject only to a refund.49 Consequently, no
condition could be considered unconstitutional. The case was
remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
the Eleventh Circuit's findings.
II. Is THE NFL PATDOWN POLICY CONSTITUTIONAL?
A. Are NFL Fans Consenting to Patdowns?
A crucial issue in the NFL patdown cases is whether fans consent
to the NFL's patdown searches. The Supreme Court has long held
4 Johnston l 442 F.Supp. 2d at 1271.
45 Id. at 1271-72.
4 Johnston 11, 490 F.3d 820, 826 (11 th Cir. 2007).
47 Id. at 825.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 824.
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that voluntary consent may validate an otherwise illegal search.5 ° The
Johnston H court and Sheehan majority agreed that the plaintiffs
involved had clearly consented to the patdowns. 51 Both decisions
seem well founded, particularly in light of the specific facts and
circumstances before both courts. However, should different facts
arise, the issue of consent becomes less straightforward.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,5 2 cited by Johnston II, is the leading
case regarding consent in Fourth-Amendment search cases. In
Bustamonte, the Court applied a "totality of the circumstances" test to
determine whether the consent at issue was voluntary. Under
Bustamonte, after evaluating the specific facts and circumstances,
consent should be deemed voluntary as long as it was not "the
product of duress or coercion, express or implied. 53 Applying this
standard, it seems both Johnston and the Sheehans consented to the
patdowns. The plaintiffs clearly knew about the patdown before
arriving at the game and simply elected to submit to the search rather
than miss attending the football game. Moreover, coercion seems
particularly unlikely at NFL football games since, as the Sheehan
court pointed out, fans always have the choice of walking away with
"no questions asked" rather than submitting to the patdown. 54
However, it is at least possible that some ticket holders that could
walk away from the search without adverse consequence are
nonetheless coerced into submission if they are unaware of their right
to walk away.55 The Supreme Court embraced this idea in U.S. v.
Mendenhall, which held that a person's subjective mental state
controls when answering the question of whether the consent at issue
is voluntary. 56 Thus, if ticket holders personally feel coerced into
submitting to patdowns because they are unaware of their right to
refuse, the argument that they could simply walk away from the
patdown without consequence is moot.
In Johnston II and Sheehan, this argument was clearly unsupported
by the facts and circumstances of each respective case. In Johnston II,
the court recognized that Johnston was "a man of heightened
50 See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946).
51 This Comment's reference to the Sheehan case refers to the decision of California's
First Appellate District, unless otherwise noted.
52 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Even though Bustamonte actually involved "third-party consent,"
the third-party aspects of the search at issue were not of particular interest to the Court.
53 Id. at 227.
54 Sheehan v. The San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 811 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007).
5 In Bustamonte, the Court never explicitly stated whether the test for voluntary consent
was an "objective" or "subjective" one.
56 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1980) (holding that on the issue of consent, the
question was whether the consent was "in fact" voluntary).
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intelligence" and seemingly "well aware of his right to refuse to
submit to the patdown search., 57 Although the Sheehan court did not
specifically address this issue, the sheer amount of patdowns the
Sheehans experienced seems to foreclose any claim of coercion. It is
hard to imagine that the Sheehans felt coerced since they kept
returning to the stadium to be searched.
Although Mendenhall was likely of no assistance to Johnston or
the Sheehans, it could imply that other NFL fans are not voluntarily
consenting to patdowns. However, this possibility seems slim. First,
under Bustamonte, a consenter's ignorance of his right to refuse
consent is only one factor to be considered in ascertaining the validity
of the consent. 58 Thus, proof that a ticket holder was not aware of his
right to refuse a patdown is hardly determinative. Second, the
patdown process itself is hardly "coercive" in the sense the Supreme
Court has required to invalidate consent. Cases successfully arguing
coercion typically involve an intimidating showing of lawful
authority.59 In contrast, intimidation hardly seems present during
patdowns at NFL games. Not only do ticket holders wait in long lines
(during which time they can easily walk away), but the patdowns are
performed by private screeners, not uniformed police officers. Unless
police officers are literally standing right next to a screener, there
seems to be little potential for people to feel they are merely
submitting to a lawful showing of authority. Consequently, it seems
that-barring an unusual fact pattern-Mendenhall provides little
assistance for fans seeking to successfully challenge the
constitutionality of the NFL patdown policy.60 Instead, it seems fans
who submit to patdowns are voluntarily submitting to a search under
Bustamonte.
Since consent normally validates even an otherwise illegal search,
perhaps the only way to avoid consenting to an NFL patdown is to
simply avoid submitting to the patdown. In other words, a fan could
purchase NFL season tickets and, before attending a game, file for
57 Johnston 11, 490 F.3d 820, 825 (11 th Cir. 2007).
58 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
59 See e.g. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003) (finding coercion when police woke up a
juvenile murder suspect at 3:00 a.m, without an arrest warrant and told him, "We need to go and
talk."); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (finding coercion when an elderly
woman living in isolated rural area allowed four police officers into her home after the officers
falsely asserted that they had a warrant).
60 It should be noted that a plaintiff's subjective mental state is not always relevant in
determining coercion. Some courts instead favor an objective test. See Ohio v. Robinette, 685
N.E.2d 762, 771 (Ohio 1997) ("[For [a person's] consent to be considered an independent act
of free will, the totality of the circumstances must clearly demonstrate that a reasonable person
would believe that he or she had the freedom to refuse to answer further questions and could in
fact leave.") (emphasis added).
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declaratory relief seeking to enjoin the NFL team from administering
the patdowns.
The dissenting opinion in Sheehan raised this scenario, and it
seems to be a plausible way around Bustamonte. According to the
Sheehan majority, the decision to purchase season tickets with
knowledge of the patdown policy automatically extinguishes any
reasonable expectation to be free from whatever privacy intrusions
the patdown policy imposes.62 The dissent refused to accept this and
believed that consent should not be inferred merely from the act of
purchase. If the Sheehans were given leave to amend their complaint,
the dissent argued, the Sheehans could argue that at the time of their
season ticket purchase, they had not yet decided whether they would
attend the 2006 games. This decision depended wholly on the
outcome of their preliminary injunction.63 In other words, if the
Sheehans purchased tickets without intending to attend games, then
they were not consenting to patdowns.
For the Sheehan majority, this argument probably made little
sense. Why would a fan purchase a ticket to a sporting event that he
never intended to attend? The answer may lie in the extremely long
waiting lists that currently exist for NFL season tickets. In Sheehan, if
the plaintiffs had waited until after their lawsuit was successful to
purchase 2006 season tickets, they would have lost their forty-year
seniority over other season-ticket holders. 64 To some, this may seem
trivial. But for NFL fans, it is anything but.
To illustrate, the Green Bay Packers have a waiting list for season
tickets that includes over 70,000 names.65 Generally as few as seventy
season tickets become available each year. Thus, in hopes of one day
obtaining season tickets, it is actually a custom in Green Bay to put a
baby's name on the waiting list as soon as the parents obtain his or
her birth certificate.66 Green Bay is not the only NFL city that has
tremendously long season ticket waiting lists. The waiting lists for the
New York Giants also includes 70,000 names, and fans wait at least
ten years before earning the right to buy season tickets.67 Moreover,
61 See Sheehan v. The San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 812 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (Rivera, J., dissenting).
62 Sheehan, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 808-09.
63 Id. at 812 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
64 Id.
65 Rick Reilly, Be the 74,659th in Line!, SL.COM, October 9, 2007,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/writers/rick-reilly/10/09/reilly 1015/index.html.
6 Id.
67 Lauren Sherman, Toughest NFL Waiting Lists, FORBES.COM, September 7, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/2007/09/07/nfl-football-tickets-forbeslife-cxls_0907tickets.html.
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the Washington Redskins have a waiting list more than twice this
size!
68
In light of these long waiting lists, it seems quite reasonable for
some fans to "re-up" their season tickets even if they only plan to
attend games should their challenge of the patdown policy prove
successful. Although the Sheehan majority failed to accept this
argument, a court more in touch with the importance that NFL
football fans place on season tickets might feel differently.
Consequently, if fans purchase tickets and file suit before attending
football games, it seems they are not consenting to the patdowns.
B. Is the NFL Patdown Policy an Unconstitutional Condition?
Another issue raised in the NFL patdown cases involves the
relevance of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine. Courts use the
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine to prevent state actors from
conditioning the grant of government benefits on the surrender of
constitutionally protected rights. 69 For example, the doctrine has been
used to protect individuals from unreasonable search and seizures
during rock concerts 70 and protest rallies.
71
In Sheehan and the Johnston cases, the plaintiffs argued that
conditioning stadium entrance on a submission to a patdown was an
unconstitutional condition. The NFL patdown policy certainly puts
fans in a precarious situation. They must submit to a patdown search
or never attend an NFL football game. As the Sheehan dissent
recognized, this is a classic "Hobson's choice. 72 However, for
different reasons both the Sheehan and Johnston II court easily
rejected the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Assuming the
court's analysis is sound, the ease in which the decisions were
reached is troubling. It may indicate that courts are quite eager to
condone far more significant privacy invasions, provided individuals
are allowed to choose which rights they relinquish and regardless of
how dubious the "choice" really is.
68 Id.
69 Sheehan, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 810 citing Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
70 Nakamoto v. Fasi, 635 P.2d 946, 951-52 (Haw. 1981) (holding that the search of a
patron's personal effects as a condition of entry into a public arena for a rock concert was
unconstitutional).
71 Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1324-25 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (holding that requiring
persons to submit to a magnetometer if they choose to gather in a protest area was a classic
"unconstitutional condition," in which the government conditions receipt of a benefit or
privilege on the relinquishment of a constitutional right).
72 Sheehan, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 813. (Rivera, J., dissenting).
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1. The Sheehan Case: Private Entities Prevail
In Sheehan, because the 49ers were a private entity, the threshold
question before the court was whether the unconstitutional-conditions
doctrine applied to private actors. In California, state courts have
consistently held that the state's Privacy Initiative protects citizens
not just from government actors, but from private actors as well. 73
Thus, it seemed at least reasonable to extend this precedent to protect
individuals when private entities condition benefits on unreasonable
privacy intrusions. However, the Sheehan court did not address this
corollary. Instead, with little discussion the court disregarded the
issue and abruptly held that the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine
did not apply to private actors.
The Sheehan court's reasoning falls in line with traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis, but this bright-line rule suggests at least the
possibility of rather alarming ramifications. Since the
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine simply does not apply to private
entities, theoretically any commercial entity may require its patrons to
give up any conceivable privacy right as a condition of doing
business. The severity of these intrusions, at least hypothetically,
could be limitless.
Of course in reality, the severity of any intrusion will likely be
held in check by a market-like bargain that each person will strike
between their own personal privacy rights and their need for whatever
commercial benefit offered. But one question worth contemplating is
whether this simple economic theory should dictate which privacy
rights private entities may constitutionally violate. On the outer most
bounds, privately owned concert venues or shopping malls could
theoretically require a strip search before entry and be perfectly
immune from constitutional violations under Sheehan. Even if
requiring strip searches would be commercial suicide for any private
entity, should this matter in the right-of-privacy analysis? Patdowns at
NFL games may be a relatively limited intrusion on privacy rights.
But the logic supporting the unconstitutional-conditions dismissal in
Sheehan draws no line regarding the scope or severity of the
73 See Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Ath. Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994) ("[T]he Privacy
Initiative in article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution creates a right of action against
private as well as government entities."); Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194,
1999 (Cal. App. 1989) ("California appellate courts and at least one federal court have
consistently held, in varying factual contexts, that article 1, section 1, protects against private
conduct."); Porten v. University of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Cal. App. 1976)
("Privacy is protected not merely against state action; it is considered an inalienable right which
may not be violated by anyone.").
74 Sheehan, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 810.
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intrusion. Consequently, the holding seems to leave more questions
than answers.
2. Johnston II: A "License" to Intrude?
Although the Johnston II court did not challenge the Johnston I
court's conclusion that TSA was a public entity, it still found a way to
neatly dispose of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine. According
to the Johnston II court, by issuing Johnston a ticket, the Buccaneers
had merely licensed him a spectator's seat at the football game.
75
Accordingly, Johnston's right to enter the stadium could be revoked
"for any reason at the Buccaneer's sole discretion, subject only to a
refund."
76
The effect of the Johnston II reasoning is to actually move a step
further than Sheehan and also exclude public entities from the
unconstitutional-condition doctrine. In other words, if a public entity
operates a venue open to the public (such as an NFL stadium, concert
hall or convention center), then it may constitutionally condition the
right of entry on the surrender of personal privacy rights, merely by
characterizing the privilege of entry as a license.
This result raises the exact same questions posed regarding the
Sheehan decision. Should private and public entities be
constitutionally permitted to force individuals to choose between
personal privacy rights and whatever benefit is being offered? Under
Sheehan and Johnston H the answer is "yes." This seemingly implies
that the market, not the law, should determine which individual
privacy rights public and private entities may ask to violate. Without
providing any limit as to scope or severity of the permitted intrusion,
such an imp:i.,ation is a rather disturbing proposition.
C. Is the NFL Patdown Policy Justified by the "Special-Needs"
Exception?
Even if NFL fans are not consenting to the suspicionless patdowns
administered before football games, the search may nevertheless
survive constitutional scrutiny if it falls into a recognized exception to
the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. Two relevant
departures from this traditional probable cause requirement in search
and seizure cases have emerged in the common law. One is the "stop-
and-frisk" exception created by Terry v. Ohio.77 Terry held that, in the
75 Johnston If, 490 F.3d 820, 824 (11 th Cir. 2007).
76 Id. (emphasis added).
77 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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interests of crime prevention, a police officer may stop and detain a
person reasonably suspected of criminal conduct without consent, for
the purpose of confirming or dispelling the reasonable belief that
criminal conduct is afoot.78 If during the detainment, the officer
reasonably suspects that the person is armed and dangerous the
officer may administer a limited "frisk" for weapons.79
The hallmark of the Terry "stop-and-frisk" is the requirement of
reasonable and particularized suspicion. Although the NFL patdown
is essentially a limited search for weapons, the searches at issue are
suspicionless and administered to every ticket holder. Thus, they
cannot be justified under Terry. If the NFL patdowns are
constitutionally permissible, regardless of whether NFL fans are
consenting to the frisk, it must be under the second relevant departure
from the probable cause requirement-the "special-needs" exception.
For years the Supreme Court has approved suspicionless searches
under what is presently known as the special-needs exception. This
exception applies when society's interest in conducting the search at
issue outweighs the individual's interest in resisting the intrusion.80 If
the society's interest prevails, neither probable cause nor consent is
required for the search at issue to be deemed "reasonable," and the
Fourth Amendment's bar of "unreasonable" searches is not violated.
To date, the Supreme Court has found this balance to weigh in favor
of society in matters regarding airport and courthouse safety,8
national border patrol,82 fixed road checkpoints for driver verification
and sobriety tests,83 supervision of parolees and probationers,84 and
middle and high school student drug testing. 85
78 1d. at 30-31.
79 Id.
80 See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) ("[O]ur
cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy
expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require
a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context."); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) ("In limited circumstances, where the
privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental
interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of
individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.").
81 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) ("Where the risk to public safety is
substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as
'reasonable'-for example, searches now routine in airports and at entrances to courts...").
2 See Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (holding that vehicle searches of
travelers crossing an international boundary may be conducted even if officials do not have any
reason to suspect that a given vehicle contains illegal aliens or smuggled objects); U.S. v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (holding that authorities may board any vessel that is
in waters that provide "ready access to the open sea" for inspection of documents without
suspicion of wrongdoing).
83 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (stating in dicta that stops of a
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In Johnston II and Sheehan, since both courts held that the
plaintiffs had voluntarily consented to the patdown, both courts
refused to discuss the merits of the special-needs exception.
Assuming arguendo that a plaintiff can reach the merits of whether
the NFL patdown policy justifies a special-needs exception (perhaps
using one of the arguments mentioned in Part III.A), the court would
be forced to undertake a constitutional-balancing test to decide if the
mass suspicionless search of NFL fans is "reasonable." Because the
NFL patdown policy is primarily designed to deter terrorism, the
ensuing special-needs analysis would likely be similar to the analysis
that allows mass suspicionless searches at airports.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has never directly decided an
airport suspicionless search case. 86 Yet it has confirmed, albeit in
dictum, the reasonableness of suspicionless searches specifically at
airports since, at airports, "the risk to public safety is substantial and
real." 87 This language was the very standard that the Johnston I court
applied to its special-needs analysis after concluding (albeit in error
according to the Eleventh Circuit) that Johnston had not legally
consented to the patdown searches.88
According to the Johnston I court, the risk that terrorism poses to
public safety at football stadiums was clearly "substantial.,
89
However, it did not automatically follow that this meant the threat
was also "real." The court reasoned that, unlike the evidence
supporting suspicionless searches at airports, the evidence supporting
suspicionless searches at NFL stadiums did not implicate a specific or
predetermined number of vehicles at a fixed checkpoint, if done for the primary purpose of
verifying driver and vehicle information, would be constitutional); Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (holding that police may establish fixed checkpoints on
highways to test for drunkenness and stop all drivers even though police have no particularized
suspicion about any one driver).
84 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (holding that parolees and probationers
may be subjected to warrantless searches by the officials responsible for them, without probable
cause, provided the search is conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing the parolee or
probationer).
85 In Vemonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), the Supreme Court allowed a
public school district to require suspicionless drug tests of every student that wished to
participate in an interscholastic sport. In Bd. ofEduc. ofIndep. School Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822 (2002), the Court expanded Vernonia to allow random drug-testing of all middle and
high school students that sought to participate in any "competitive extracurricular activity,"
including band, choir, and clubs such as Academic Team, and Future Homemakers of America.
86 Kyle P. Hanson, Note, Suspicionless Terrorism Checkpoints Since 9/11: Searching for
Uniformity, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 171, 180 (2007).
87 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
88 Johnston 1, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1258 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
89 Id. at 1266 (reasoning that no one could "seriously dispute" the magnitude of the risk
that terrorism posed to public safety in the U.S.).
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"concrete danger," but rather a "generalized threat of terrorism to
large gatherings." 90 Incidentally, the Johnston I court held that the
special-needs exception did not permit the NFL to constitutionally
intrude on the individual privacy rights of ticket holders by
administering patdowns.
There is obviously considerable tension in the special-needs
analysis as it applies to the NFL patdown policy. If courts require a
specific showing that NFL stadiums are indeed terrorist targets before
allowing patdowns, then millions of people otherwise protected could
be left vulnerable to acts of terror. Moreover, most ticket holders not
only consent to the patdowns, they welcome them because it helps
ensure a safer environment. But as both Johnston I and Johnston H
recognized, the issue in the NFL patdown cases "is not about the
wisdom of... [the] pat-down policy, whether the average Buccaneers
fan supports or objects to the pat-down searches, or whether a judge
believes the pat-downs are wise." 91 The issue is whether patdown
searches at NFL Stadiums violate privacy rights. Comparing the
Johnston I analysis (which was rejected because of its findings
regarding consent and not the special-needs exception) to the
Supreme Court case Chandler v. Miller, the answer to this question
seems to be "yes." Although terrorism at NFL football games clearly
represents a "substantial" threat to public safety, the NFL has not yet
presented evidence that this threat is also "real."
In Chandler, the Supreme Court decided the state of Georgia had
no special need that justified requiring candidates for public office to
submit to drug tests.92 According to the Court, "[n]otably lacking in
respondents' presentation [was] any indication of a concrete danger
demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule., 93
Specifically, the record provided no evidence of drug abuse by
elected officials. Instead, the reason advanced for the special-need
exception involved the general sentiment that, since public officials
were vested with executive authority to make public policy, they
should fully appreciate the perils of drug use.94 This was insufficient
to satisfy the requirement that the threat at issue was "real and not
simply hypothetical." 9 As support, the Court noted that in Vernonia
School District v. Acton,96 the random drug-testing of high-school
9 Id.
9' Johnston 11, 490 F.3d 820, 824 (11 th Cir. 2007) (citing Johnston 1, 442 F. Supp. 2d at
1258).
92 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
93 Id. at 318-19.
94 Id. at 311.
95 Id. at 319.
- 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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students engaged in interscholastic athletic competitions was
sustained only after a finding that high-school drug use represented an
"immediate crisis" caused by "a sharp increase in drug use" in the
school district at issue.97 In fact, district court findings had established
that the student athletes in the school district were not only "among
the drug users," they were "leaders of the drug culture."
98
Applying Chandler to the NFL patdown policy, it seems that the
evidence so far offered by the NFL simply cannot justify a special-
needs exception. Although individuals with known ties to terrorist
organizations have downloaded images of NFL stadiums from the
Internet, the FBI has investigated the incident and determined it
presented "not even a perceived or implied threat."99 Moreover, most
of the other evidence offered in Sheehan and the Johnston cases had
nothing to do with sporting venues. The NFL pointed to the 2004
bombing of a commuter train in Spain and a government list of
tourism sites that were potential terrorist targets. This list included not
sporting venues, but mostly historical landmarks such as the
Washington Monument and the Statute of Liberty. 100 The only
evidence that involved an actual threat to a sporting venue was an
arrest of a person with apparent plans to bomb a soccer stadium in
Spain. 1°1 But no evidence cited specific threats to sporting venues in
the United States. At best, the evidence provided supports a general
fear that terrorism could strike in any place where the public gathers.
This is insufficient to satisfy the requirement set forth in Chandler
that the threat at issue be "real and not simply hypothetical."
Yet this does not imply that the NFL patdown policy can never be
justified by the special-needs exception. In fact, concrete evidence
that could satisfy Chandler may already exist. According to the
NFL's Director of Event Security, certain information was not
presented in Johnston I because much of the NFL's intelligence
justifying the patdowns was "law-enforcement sensitive."',0 2
However, until NFL teams provide information that actually links the
general fear of terrorism to something real and not hypothetical, they
simply cannot satisfy Chandler regardless of whether evidence is
"law-enforcement sensitive." As the Johnston I court emphasized, if
97 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 316 (referring to Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649).
98 Id; See also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (allowing suspicionless
searches of parolees after the state provided empirical evidence demonstrating the high rate of
recidivism in its parolee population).
99 Johnston 1, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1258, 1268 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
'0OId. at 1267-68.
101 Id.
102 Johnston 1, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 n.14.
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intelligence supporting the special need exists but is sensitive, the
evidence should still be provided to the court in camera.
10 3
CONCLUSION
Most NFL fans willingly consent to NFL patdowns before entering
an NFL stadium. For those who do not, their mere submission to the
actual patdown likely qualifies as legal consent since the NFL
patdown process is hardly coercive. Although there is some question
as to whether public and private actors should be permitted to
constitutionally condition commercial benefits on the surrender of
personal-privacy rights, a court could easily circumvent the
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine argument by applying the
reasoning in Sheehan or Johnston 11. Under Sheehan, the
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine has no relevance if the NFL
stadium is privately owned and operated. Under Johnston II, if the
ticket is viewed as a license, then even publicly owned and operated
stadiums may constitutionally attach conditions of entry.
The only NFL ticket holders that are seemingly not consenting to
the patdowns are those that purchase season tickets and subsequently
file suit challenging the patdowns without ever attending any NFL
games. Although the Sheehan majority disagreed, the mere act of
purchasing a ticket should not automatically imply that a fan is
consenting to a subsequent patdown, even if that fan is aware of the
NFL patdown policy. The fan could simply be preserving his
seniority over other season-ticket holders. If a court accepts this
argument, then it would likely address whether the NFL patdown
policy is nonetheless constitutionally justified by the special-needs
exception to the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement.
In light of the Johnston I analysis, a plaintiff has a strong
likelihood of prevailing unless the NFL is prepared to cite specific
evidence that suggests United States sporting venues are potential
terrorist targets. This would satisfy the requirement under Chandler
that the threat to public safety be not only "substantial" but also
"real." However, if the NFL presents only the evidence it has
presented thus far, the fear of terrorism at NFL stadiums seems to be
nothing more than a general fear that terrorism could strike at any
time in any place where the public gathers. Consequently, the NFL
patdown policy would likely not satisfy the special-needs exception
and, therefore, be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
1031d. ("[If the] NFL relied on sensitive law enforcement evidence demonstrating a
'substantial and real' threat to NFL games in addition to what was presented, it was incumbent
upon the TSA to present that evidence, perhaps in camera.").
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Requiring the NFL to demonstrate that a real and concrete threat of
terror exists at U.S. sporting venues in order to satisfy the special-
needs exception is the right result. If mere generalized threats of
potential harm satisfied the special-needs exception, then it seems
there would be no stopping an increase of mass suspicionless searches
in the name of terror. Not long ago, Justice Scalia warned in
California v. Acevedo that Fourth-Amendment privacy rights were
slowly disappearing.
Even before today's decision, the "warrant requirement" had
become so riddled with exceptions that it was basically
unrecognizable. . . Our intricate body of law regarding
"reasonable expectation of privacy" has been developed
largely as a means of creating these exceptions, enabling a
search to be denominated not a Fourth Amendment "search"
and therefore not subject to the general warrant
requirement. 04
This trend is no doubt continuing. At first glance, NFL patdowns
seem minor and utterly non-intrusive. Most of us even want the
patdowns at NFL stadiums because they offer us more protection. But
allowing one minor privacy intrusion creates precedent that may
support another not so minor intrusion. Thus, before we slowly
migrate through stadium-security checkpoints without a hint of
protest, perhaps we should turn around once in a while to see how far
we have come.
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